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1. Introduction 
Visual imagery is, for most of us, a conspicuous ingredient of everyday experience, playing a 
prominent role in memory, daydreaming and creativity. Galton, who pioneered the 
quantitative study of visual imagery with his famous ‘breakfast-table survey’, reported a wide 
variation in its subjective vividness (Galton, 1880).  Indeed, some participants described ‘no 
power of visualising’. This phenomenon has received little attention since, though Faw 
reported that 2.1-2.7% of  2,500 participants ‘claim no visual imagination’ (Faw, 2009).  
The experience of voluntary imagery is associated with activity in fronto-parietal ‘executive’ 
systems and in posterior brain regions which together enable us to generate images on the 
basis of our stored knowledge of appearances (Bartolomeo, 2008). The relative contributions 
of lower and higher order visual regions to the experience of visual imagery are debated 
(Bartolomeo, 2008). Clinical reports suggest the existence of two major types of neurogenic 
visual imagery impairment: i) visual memory disorders, causing both visual agnosia and 
imagery loss, and ii) ‘imagery generation’ deficits selectively disabling imagery (Farah, 
1984).  
In 2010 we reported a particularly ‘pure’ case of imagery generation disorder, in a 65 year 
old man who became unable to summon images to the mind’s eye after coronary angioplasty 
(Zeman et al., 2010). Following a popular description of our paper (Zimmer, 2010), we were 
contacted by over twenty individuals who recognised themselves in the article’s account of 
‘blind imagination’, with the important difference that their imagery impairment had been 
lifelong. Here we describe the features of their condition, elicited by a questionnaire, and 
suggest a name – aphantasia - for this poorly recognised phenomenon.  
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2. Results 
21 individuals contacted us because of their lifelong reduction of visual imagery. We 
explored the features of their condition with a questionnaire devised for the purpose and the 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1973) (see supplementary 
material for further details).  Participants typically became aware of their condition in their 
teens or twenties when, through conversation or reading, they realised that most people who 
‘saw things in the mind’s eye’, unlike our participants, enjoyed a quasi-visual experience. 
19/21 were male. 5/21 reported affected relatives. 10/21 told us that all modalities of imagery 
were affected. Our participants rating of imagery vividness was significantly lower than that 
of 121 controls (p<.001, Mann Whitney U test – see Figure 1). Despite their substantial 
(9/21) or complete (12/21) deficit in voluntary visual imagery, as judged by the VVIQ, the 
majority of participants described involuntary imagery. This could occur during wakefulness, 
usually in the form of ‘flashes’ (10/21) and/or during dreams (17/21). Within a group of 
participants who reported no imagery while completing the VVIQ, 10/11 reported 
involuntary imagery during wakefulness and/or dreams, confirming a significant dissociation 
between voluntary and involuntary imagery (p<.01, McNemar Test). Participants described a 
varied but modest effect on mood and relationships. 14/21 participants reported difficulties 
with autobiographical memory. The same number identified compensatory strengths in 
verbal, mathematical and logical domains. Their successful performance in a task that would 
normally elicit imagery – ‘count how many windows there are in your house or apartment’ - 
was achieved by drawing on what participants described as ‘knowledge’, ‘memory’ and 
‘subvisual’ models.  
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3. Discussion  
φαντασία, phantasia, is the classical Greek term for imagination, defined by Aristotle as the 
‘faculty/power by which a phantasma [image or mental representation] is presented to us’ 
(Aristotle, 1968). We propose the use of the term ‘aphantasia’ to refer to a condition of 
reduced or absent voluntary imagery. Terms used previously in related contexts include 
‘defective revisualisation’ (Botez, Olivier, Vezina, Botez, & Kaufman, 1985) and ‘visual 
irreminiscence’ (Nielsen, 1946).  
Sceptics could claim that aphantasia is itself a mere fantasy: describing our inner lives is 
difficult and undoubtedly liable to error (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007). We suspect, 
however, that aphantasia will prove to be a variant of neuropsychological functioning akin to 
synaesthesia (Barnett & Newell, 2008) and to congenital prosopagnosia (Gruter, Gruter, Bell, 
& Carbon, 2009). Indeed, aphantasia may have some specific relationship to these disorders, 
as congenital prosopagnosia is associated with unusually low (Gruter et al., 2009), and 
synaesthesia with unusually high (Barnett & Newell, 2008), VVIQ scores. 
The participants described here were self-selected and some of our findings, such as the male 
predominance, may reflect the readership of a science magazine like Discover. There is a 
need, therefore, for further study in a more representative sample. The existence of lifelong 
‘aphantasia’ raises numerous additional questions. How commonly does congenital 
aphantasia occur? Existing data suggest a frequency of around 2% but there is no fully 
reported large scale study. The evidence of familial occurrence should be investigated further. 
Does congenital aphantasia have objective neuropsychological associations? Correlations 
between imagery vividness and cognitive functioning have been elusive in the past, but 
recently developed measures of autobiographical memory (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, 
& Moscovitch, 2002), imaginative thinking and ‘visual-object intelligence’ (Blazhenkova & 
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Kozhevnikov, 2010) open up new avenues for exploration. Personality and mood may also be 
relevant variables. Are there subtypes of congenital aphantasia? The descriptions given by 
our participants suggest that in some cases visual memory is preserved even if visual imagery 
is absent, while others may rely entirely on non-visual representations in memory tasks; the 
relationship between aphantasia and congenital prosopagnosia also deserves further study.  If, 
as we hypothesise, the absence or reduction of visual imagery has neural correlates, can we 
discover these? We are optimistic that modern structural and functional brain imaging may 
help to answer questions about the nature of visual imagery that were first posed in ancient 
Greece and first quantified at Sir Francis Galton’s breakfast table over a hundred years ago. 
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Figure legend 
Figure 1: Distribution of Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) scores in 
participants with aphantasia and control participants (VVIQ range extends from 16, lowest 
imagery score to 80, highest imagery score). 
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